THOUGHTS
ON
TOTAL FORCE
IN 1990

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I assume I was asked here as a tie to the past—to reminisce. So I will give a little history, but my emphasis will be on today—Desert Shield—and implications for the future.

Going back to Revolutionary times, the *Federalist Papers*, the founding fathers clearly called for a small standing Army and Navy to be rounded out by militia, volunteers, and conscripts. The active force was to meet operational needs at lower levels and serve as a cadre in large-scale operations.

The 17,000-man regular army grew to the hundreds of thousands in the Civil War. Innumerable regular Generals were fired.

In World War II, a relatively small active Army was supplemented by 100 Combat Divisions built on Guard cadres. Of the 8 Divisions most feared by the enemy in World War II, 6 were Guard Divisions. As to leadership in the field, more regular Generals were fired than Guard Generals.
In the Korean War, the strongest Guard troops supported NATO, but the Guard was also deployed to Korea in time to be involved in the most brutal battles of the war.

As to Vietnam, a decision was made (not by the Guard) that the Guard stay home--contributing to the lack of community base to support the war. Belatedly, the Guard was employed and fought well. I flew missions with some units and island-hopped back with the New Mexico Air Guard.

Using erroneous assumptions of the enemy strength--not based on available intelligence but on Ivory Tower systems analysts' imagination, the concept of "measured response" was developed. This could show that the Guard was not needed by directing study results instead of study, thus contributing to our glorious victory in Vietnam.

There was a major change in U.S. Policy following Vietnam as a result of a conscious decision to fully integrate the Guard and reserve components into the first line of national defense--Total Force.
The large standing Army, a product of the cold war, is configured as a heavy force for use in Europe. Due more often than not to air- and sea-lift considerations, scale of operations, and political limitations, the Army's force structure has been awkward and incomplete for such roles as Granada, Panama, and the Iranian hostage rescue project.

Where does Total Force come in?

The prototype of the Total Force was started in the Air Force. Despite protestations that the Guard could not fly jets, maintain them, or fight them; despite opposition to converting cargo craft to refueling and lack of interest in C-47s becoming gunships, the Air Force had gradually accepted the idea that the Guard could fly and fight and was a real resource.

Besides the problems, there were advantages. The Air Force Secretaries and Generals were interested in R & D--not the Guard. They let me present the Guard budget--always getting more than I asked for from Guard-oriented committees to which Wimpy Wilson and I had provided the questions.
So, when I moved into Defense from Air Force, we had what amounted to a Total Force model in being.

With the help of a brilliant regular Army Colonel, Ray Webster, (to his career's detriment) I planned to convert the Air Force's Total Force concept to Defense policy. A draft of a letter for the Secretary of Defense to sign was leaked to the Services. The Air Force was silent. The Navy Secretary said this looked good, but the Admirals circled the ships.

There were two reactions in the Army. First, there was the idea that Total Force was innocuous and could be ignored--a not unusual reaction to "civilian control." Second, there was a strong feeling that Total Force was some sort of camouflaged assault against the Citadel on the Hudson. The Army did not see Total Force as a gift to them of a great resource. They did not see Total Force as a chance to show the flag in every state and county and, thereby, gain political, social, and emotional support needed for development in peacetime, as well as ready units in wartime.
Because of the communist threat combined with budgetary generosity and Secretary Jack Marsh's understanding, the Generals of the Army grudgingly supported the "roundout" concept and provided Guard training, etc... And they contributed great quantities of lip service to Total Force as they included the Guard in contingency plans, exercises, and troop lists for deployment.

Then communism was suddenly no longer the great threat--and instability in Europe is too nebulous to be considered as a threat. As a result, the pending budget reductions and the Guard were perceived as a great pincer movement threatening the Army. Instead of using the Guard economy and its support outside the beltway as assets, the Army illogically proposed extensive concurrent cuts in Guard strength--shades of McClellan, Custer, and Burnside! And they are again coming up with proposals which would starve the Guard for equipment--veritable sanctions. And they do this in spite of the fact they know full well on which side the Guard will fight.

Back to history, after a number of flanking efforts and frontal assaults mixed with tempting travel offers, lunches, and awards, the
Army and Navy lost their campaigns to block the Total Force. Laird signed the paper making Total Force into policy.

The basic argument was that it had worked in the Air Force. The clinching point was that if fly-boy Generals could make it work that certainly the brilliant Admirals, the mature Army Generals, and the "nothing's-impossible-for-us" Marine Generals could do the same job. The last gasping arguments about complexity of equipment compared with the Air Force was obviously fallacious.

The Total Force lived happily ever after? No, as one of our sons in the Indiana Guard said, "Total Force is like freedom. You have to keep fighting for it."

In the earlier days of this continuing fight, the Army insisted that the Guard should be just a manpower pool to be used in lieu of a draft to provide fillers for active duty units. The concept of today's over 80 percent combat-ready units--by the Army's own standards of readiness measurement--was totally inconceivable to many ring-knockers in the Army. I was told that no matter what effort and money might be put into Army Guard or how good the weapons and
exercises, that 11 months would be required after mobilization to field a Guard unit. Repeatedly--like a brainwashing--I was told: Each man in each squad will have to pass individual training tests; then each squad, platoon, and company will train and test and so on to brigade level. This brainwashing is used in all services to make captive hostages of civilian bosses.

No, General, I don't want to send untrained troops into battle. Yes, General, I know that equipment has gone to Iran and Iraq instead of the Guard. Yes, General, I know the limitations of the Guard. But you could have better equipped and trained your certain allies--the Guard and reserve. Yes, General, they would not like sand, would complain of the heat, and would like to be home for Christmas. But their real esprit is truly excellent. They didn't like Valley Forge or Shiloh or the Argonne. They fought like Hell. Yes, General, in today's world--Desert Shield--I realize that the concept of "measured application of force" is abroad again. I realize we hope for a peaceful solution, but I again see the potential analytical mistake of not getting there "fustest with the mostest"--that complex mixture of McClellan and Custer mental set--of leaving the fighting to the Elite Force instead of the Total Force.
And maybe it is possible. Maybe only 4,000 of the 5,000 Iraqi tanks will operate if we are forced into the military option. Maybe 300,000 of the "battle hardened" Iraqis are really "battle weary," will run if we enter their homeland.

In any event, the "measured reaction" application of force reminds me of McClellan on one hand and the skillful underestimation of the opposition by Custer on the other hand.

In some quarters, heralded as a new and innovative idea, the Total Force Policy was actually a return to a standing military as envisaged by the founding fathers--a force that due to its structure and limitations cannot enter a full scale conflict without public support and consensus.

By relying on the Guard and reserves, the nation received a larger defense force for less cost. In the 80s, the Guard's performance, combat readiness, and the greatly increased defense funding levels allowed the Guard to move to the forefront of national defense at a fraction of the cost of comparable active forces.
The decision to have a smaller, yet ready, U.S. military force has been made. The future forces decisions are how much to reduce, how to execute the reductions, and where to take the cuts in the active force while tailoring and increasing the Guard and reserves.

Key is the determination of an acceptable level of risk in the face of the changing threat. The factors that effect this determination include the potential for action versus the capability of potential aggressor forces, the intentions of potential adversaries, and a cost analysis of the options available to the United States.

I would like to now give a two-hour lesson on force structure.

I am, however, driven to comment on a few subjects—not historical, but timely, pragmatic Total Force issues that are current.

For instance, there are a number of options the Army is considering for dealing with the excess equipment resulting from the deactivation of forces in Europe. One is to destroy the equipment.
One is returning the equipment to CONUS and placing it in storage and using it as spares.

Under no circumstances does it make economic sense to destroy first-line equipment in Europe when CONUS-based Guard units have critical shortages and when transportation costs would be hundreds of times less expensive than buying new equipment.

Foreign military sales disposal will modernize friendly forces (or future enemies) but leaves our own Guard less prepared than is desirable. More importantly, placing equipment in the Guard makes it available for training and deployment with Guard units to other parts of the world should the need arise. In addition, Congress would not have to appropriate as much additional money to buy equipment for the Guard and reserve.

Whatever the decision on equipment, the Army's three tier equipment modernization plan, proposed in 1989, will have to be examined closely in light of the new scenario. That plan forced the Guard and reserve into a mode where the newest equipment to be received by the Guard was to be 12 to 18 years old at the time of
receipt. In light of the pending changes in missioning and force structure, the equipment plan needs close scrutiny.

When the Guard is measured by its performance, it is equal to any Army in the world. The Guard has proven that it can perform the mission. Deployments and evaluations of Guard mission performance in 60 countries around the world stand in testimony to its readiness.

Desert Shield has offered a number of valuable insights into the efficacy of past Army force mix decisions. The fact that the Guard and reserve had to be called to sustain an initial forward deployed active force of less than 50,000 suggests that the forces are not properly mixed. It suggests that the Active Army can sustain itself only in an environment where it has permanent troop stationing. This is hardly indicative of a strategic force, capable of rapid deployment and sustainment. After examining support ratios, one concludes that the active force has too many combat and garrison forces and insufficient support forces.
"ROUNDOUT" is a critical issue raised by Desert Shield. The President, the Congress, the American people, the U.S. Air Force, and the National Guard have faith and confidence in "roundout" and the capability and dedication of the Guard. The Army does not. This is hard to understand--after all it is the Army who sets the standards the Guard must meet, rates the performance and readiness of the Guard, and plans, on paper, to use the Guard. It is also the Army that has testified for years before the Congress that the "roundout" units would fight with their active units. Yet, when it is time to use the system, the Army forgets. The active units used in Desert Shield in place of Guard roundout units were not nearly as ready or capable as the Guard roundout units. In fact, many active units that actually deployed to Saudi Arabia were not as ready as like units in the Guard. There appears to have been a conscious decision not to use any Guard or reserve unit if at all possible--to throw out years of training together, ignore readiness ratings, and field a less capable force. And, then, when the Army had to use the Guard and reserve, it chose to call only support units, no combat units. It acted as if "roundout" never existed. The Congress and the American people have invested more than $100 billion in training and equipping the Guard in the past 10 years. The Guard has
become as professional a force as any military in the world. The Guard and the American people have a right to demand a return on the investment--employing the Guard in the missions and roles for which it has trained.

An Anecdote:

For years a Guard Brigade has been training as "roundout" to a regular Army Division. The Guard Brigade has received its readiness rating and evaluation from the Army Division Commander. If the Brigade is not deployable or needs major training, then the integrity of the Army's readiness rating process is invalid.

Further, the Guard Brigade has deployed to the NTC and probably has more individual members that actually went through NTC than the Division's active brigades due to higher retention rates of the Guard Brigade.

What of the active unit used instead of the ready Guard "roundout" Brigade?
It is a school brigade with officers and NCOs who are teachers. It has been to NTC but not with the Division's active brigades—and the question of sending this school brigade back to the states for NTC has been raised!!

I have impugned the judgment of some anonymous generals—for which I don't apologize in the light of Custer, McClellan, and some I have personally known.

I have exposed my bias. That bias is not for the Guard but for the nation. In it is a warning that may be lost—or it may be heard in Congress—it could even be followed up by a good investigative reporter.

No, my bias is not for the Guard, but I did join you in Tennessee many years ago. Any volunteers here from Tennessee?

Then the Alabama Air Guard with two deployments—anyone from Alabama?
Then the Air Guard of New Mexico--a bunch of real top guns--and a son is in the New Mexico Army Guard--which has some ready anti-aircraft capability. Anyone from New Mexico?

How about Indiana--? The son in the Indiana Air Guard said last week--"Well, Dad, it looks like folks have had to fight for Total Force like fighting for freedom--you just have to keep on."

And how about California? And how about Maine?

And now all the states between--

And in closing, a word from a son on active duty in the Air Force--a son who is currently "in harm's way" (a regular Air Force captain)--"We couldn't get along without the Guard here. Wish we had more. Mom, I'm doing fine. Don't worry. And God bless us all!"--Jim.

Yes, God bless all of the Total Force and the nation it is designed to protect.