This article challenges some perceptions arising from the long-standing debate concerning the sharing of turf by organizations. It shows that the structure of an organization as well as its need to complete tasks affects the likelihood of it sharing turf. It also shows that organizations are motivated by more than the desire to expand budgets, power, or autonomy. Finally, organizations may make choices that help them complete a task in the short run, but in the long run undermine their ability to survive. These points are illustrated through a case study involving the Air National Guard and the Air Force.

THE SKY’S NO LIMIT
Turf and the Air Force
and the Air National Guard

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There has been a long-standing debate concerning the sharing of turf by agencies and organizations. This article will challenge some perceptions arising from that debate. It will show that the structure of an organization affects the likelihood of it sharing turf. Moreover, it will show that organizations are motivated by more than the expansion of their budgets, autonomy, or power. They also are motivated by task completion, and if sharing turf helps them achieve this goal, they will do so. These points will be shown through a case study involving the Air National Guard and the Air Force. Before turning to the case, a discussion of the literature dealing with bureaucratic turf and jurisdiction is in order.¹

BUREAUCRATIC MOTIVATIONS AND TURF

Some have argued that bureaucrats seek to maximize the budgets of their agencies (Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 1965). Budget maximization helps ensure the survival of the agency. It also gives bureaucrats the
resources needed to accomplish other goals and tasks whether this be personal aggrandizement or helping the public through new policies and their implementation. Budget maximization should also lead to bureaucratic growth and imperialism. Only by becoming larger and doing more things can a bureaucrat justify a larger budget from Congress and the president.

Empirically, we know that many agencies of government have refused to take on new tasks. Moreover, agencies have often willingly gone along with the reduction of their budgets. This has led some to argue that bureaucrats do not seek to maximize their budgets but instead to maximize the amount of autonomy they have (Ellison, 1995; Kunioka & Rothenberg, 1993; Wilson, 1989). Bureaucrats seek to have control over their own destinies. Autonomy gives them this control. It also increases the chances of the agency surviving. Autonomy means that the agency controls its own resources, how it goes about accomplishing tasks or missions, and so on. This also means that the organization is not dependent on others to perform key tasks or missions. Thus, survival is enhanced. This argument explains why agencies may refuse to add tasks or agree to a budget cut. New tasks often force the agency to cooperate with more organizations or actors. This will limit its autonomy. Budget cuts can be softened by giving the organization more control over the money that it has left.

A third argument is that bureaucrats wish to maximize their power (Rourke, 1969). Thus, they wish to maximize the power of their agencies. Like autonomy, power helps the organization to survive. Maximizing power can also lead to an agency’s refusing to pick up new tasks or refusing to pursue larger budgets. Tasks that are inordinately difficult, are supported by unpopular constituents, or force the organization to cooperate with other organizations will be avoided. These things can hurt the power base of an agency. Larger budgets can also hurt an agency’s power when they come with strings attached or bring the agency greater visibility, making it easier for other actors to monitor its behavior.

All of these views have one thing in common. They lead to the conclusion that agencies should be unwilling to cooperate with others that share a primary mission or task. Not only will agencies be unwilling to cooperate with others sharing a primary mission or task, but agencies will fight for sole control of the task. Budgets cannot be maximized when other agencies are performing the same tasks. Autonomy is at risk when there are competitors about. Power is reduced when others can do what you can. This should mean that agencies will share tasks with another only when forced to by outsiders. The relationship between organizations forced to share a task should be highly conflictual. None of the organizations
involved will trust the others or work well with them. There are plenty of examples to support these expectations. One example is the competitive rivalries that have developed between the U.S. Customs Department and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) over the drug-control mission. Customs and DEA agents have frequently worked at cross-purposes even though each is expected to cooperate with the other in controlling the drug trade (Waldman, Miller, & Sandea, 1989). A second example would be the highly competitive and poisonous relationship between the U.S. Army and the Army National Guard (Jacobs, 1994). Officially, these two organizations are partners. However, neither organization trusts the other, and each has had significant problems working successfully with the other.

Although there are many examples that support the idea that rivalry will result from organizations sharing a task or mission, there are also examples of agencies successfully cooperating with each other. None of the above views seems to explain this type of behavior adequately. Why would an agency decide to become a partner with another agency instead of a rival? This case study aims to begin developing some answers for this question.

It will be shown that task completion may lead to agency personnel ceding some autonomy, budgets, or power. This flies in the face of most of the organizational theory literature, which sees policy making, task completion, and so forth as secondary concerns of bureaucrats and agencies. Generally speaking, completion of tasks is only important as it pertains to maximizing budgets, autonomy, or power. This study will show that some tasks may be so important that organizational concerns become somewhat secondary. This is especially the case when failing to do so creates the possibility that the agency or organization risks a catastrophic failure in performing a task. The study will also show that the actions of subunits within an agency or organization are important determinants of whether the larger organization will be willing to cooperate or cede a role to another. The actions a subunit takes open up new options to the organization as a whole. Some of the options may be quite beneficial to the whole but also quite harmful to the subunit that took the initial actions. Finally, the study will show that organizational survival trumps all other motivations by agency officials. An organization will be willing to trade autonomy, power, and budgets if that is what is required for the organization to survive.

Before moving to the case study, it should be noted that I assume that the organizations involved are self-interested. They have goals, desires, and so on. This does not mean that the organizations are not interested in
serving the public or defending its nation’s interests. As Morton Halperin (1974) has discussed, organizational interests often are linked to national or public ones. Where one sits is where one stands, and this should be expected. Organizations will have access to different types of information, and this will skew their perceptions. All organizations will also have the desire to survive. If organizations did not have this motive, they would have no incentive to perform the tasks assigned to them. The need for survival helps to hold organizations accountable to the larger public. It can also lead to an organization’s failing to see that larger societal interests are more important than the organization’s narrow parochial interests.

THE CASE STUDY

In the early 1950s, the Air National Guard and Air Force began an experimental program of using Air National Guard units as part of its air defense alert system (Gross, 1985). The experiment required the Guard to place several aircraft and aircrews on dawn-to-dusk alert status around the country. These Guard units would be required to respond to alerts in the same manner as active duty units on alert. It also meant that Guard units could face combat before an official declaration of war, a first for reserve units in the United States.

The experiment proved to be a success (Gross, 1985). Air Guard units performed almost as well, if not as well, as their active counterparts in responding to air defense alerts. The success of the Air Guard units led Guard leaders to support the creation of a permanent program. The Air Force agreed, and in 1954, the Air Guard Runway Alert program was created (Gross, 1985). Initially, eight Air Guard squadrons were required to maintain two aircraft on 14-hour alert status 7 days a week.\(^2\) Guard aircraft on alert were expected to respond to a defense warning within 5 minutes of its receipt. Guard participation grew to 20 squadrons by 1957 and 22 by 1966. The number of squadrons involved in the program declined after 1966 as the United States became more concerned with missile attack instead of attack from manned aircraft. However, the burdens placed on those participating increased. In the 1960s, Air Guard units began sitting 24-hour alerts 7 days a week. These units also were required to maintain more aircraft on alert status than previously. By the late 1990s, Air Guard units were performing 100% of the air defense mission within the continental United States (U.S. Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 1998).
Two things about this program challenge the literature dealing with turf, autonomy, and the drive for power by organizations. The first is that through the Runway Alert program, the Air Force created a competitor for its missions. Before this program, the Air Guard was to be used only during wartime and as a last resort. It was seen as incapable of performing missions during peacetime. Many also questioned whether it could perform as well as active units. The Runway Alert program changed this. It showed that not only could the Guard perform during peacetime, but it could also perform as well as active units. More significantly, Air Guard units were performing the air defense mission at a lower cost. Obviously, this creates a potential problem for the Air Force. If the Guard can perform as well as the active force at less cost, why not give it even more of the active force’s missions and tasks?

The second is that the Runway Alert program required the Air Guard to relinquish some of its autonomy to the Air Force. The Air National Guard and Army National Guard are rather unique organizations (Heller, 1994; Hill, 1964; Jacobs, 1994; Sorley, 1993). They are controlled in peacetime by the states and during wartime by the federal government. This gives the Guard autonomy that other reserve organizations do not have in the United States. During peacetime, the active services must obtain consent from the states when attempting to use Guard units or make changes to them. Also, the Guard has its own bureau in the Pentagon. Generally, the active services must go through this bureau when managing Guard units. This means that the active services submit orders and requirements to the bureau, which then forwards them to the proper unit. The Air Guard’s unique institutional structure has also allowed it to cultivate political relationships within Congress and at the state level (Derthick, 1965). These have been used to protect Guard budgets, missions, and tasks. These have also created resentment and conflict with the active services.

The Runway Alert program required the Air Guard to allow the Air Force to directly control its units during peacetime (Gross, 1985). This meant that state Guard officials and the National Guard Bureau in the Pentagon would be bypassed. The Air Force would have absolute control over the Air Guard units participating. Thus, the Runway Alert program’s peacetime mission for the Air Guard was paid for with some of the Air Guard’s traditional autonomy from the active services.

Making the loss of autonomy more significant is the fact that the Air Force and Air Guard relationship in the early 1950s was untrusting and conflictual (Gross, 1985). In the late 1940s, the Air Force attempted to eliminate the Air Guard by merging it with the Air Force Reserve, which
was solely controlled by the Air Force. Moreover, during the Korean War, the Air Guard accused the Air Force of misusing its units. The Air Force saw the Guard as a collection of weekend warriors that were ill-trained and used Congress to aggrandize its interests at the expense of the Air Force. Neither organization trusted the other. Considering the tenor of the Air Guard/Air Force relationship at the time, it is remarkable that the Air Guard would later agree to any loss of its autonomy.

Why would the Air Force be willing to cede turf to the Guard? Why would it be willing to create a potential competitor? Why would the Guard be willing to cede some autonomy over its affairs to an organization that it did not trust? In the next two sections, these questions will be answered.

CEDING TURF

To understand why the Air Force would be willing to cede turf to a potential rival, one must first understand how the Air Force perceives itself as an organization. Carl Builder (1989) has stated that “the Air Force . . . sees itself as the embodiment of an idea, a concept of warfare, a strategy made possible and sustained by modern technology.” The idea is strategic bombardment. All other tasks and missions are secondary to it. This includes air defense.

An easy conclusion would be that because air defense is secondary to strategic bombardment, the Air Force would have no trouble ceding it to another organization. If this were true, however, the Air Force would have ceded the role of close-air support long ago. It is seen as even more secondary than air defense because it requires the direct support of army units in combat. Yet, the Air Force has resisted all attempts by the army to take the role.

The elevation of strategic bombing led to the ceding of turf in a more indirect fashion. The Air Force became the dominant military service during the 1950s (Huntington, 1961). Eisenhower’s New Look Defense policies led to a heavy reliance on strategic nuclear forces as a method for protecting U.S. interests while also keeping defense costs down. Under the New Look, the Air Force received 45% of total defense outlays, whereas the U.S. Army received less than 25%. However, the Air Force used most of these resources to build up the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and its long-range bomber forces. Other organizations in the Air Force were starved for funds and asked to tighten their belts so that SAC could have an even larger share (Futrell, 1989).
The Air Force’s Air Defense Command (ADC) was particularly affected by this belt tightening. Beginning in 1951, ADC leaders began complaining about the effects that resource cuts were having on the command’s ability to perform its mission. In 1951, General Benjamin Chidlaw, head of the ADC, commented that he had been led to believe by the Air Force that he would be given enough resources to stop about 30% of attacking aircraft on the United States. Instead, the resources he was given were not enough to stop even 10% of attacking aircraft. This, exclaimed Chidlaw, “scared the hell out of me, but plenty” (Schaffel, 1991, p. 148).

In 1953, General Chidlaw wrote a letter to the chief of staff of the Air Force complaining that his command could not afford any more cuts in personnel. He stated,

Air Defense Command has continued to receive “across the board” cuts with no apparent reference to analysis of the effect of these arbitrary percentage reductions on the effectiveness of Air Defense Command. Cuts levied in this fashion imply that all affected commands have enough “fat” to absorb the reduction without hampering their effectiveness. I reemphasize that Air Defense Command has been without such “fat” from the outset. We have long since reached the last notch on the belt. (Headquarters Air Defense, 1953b, p. 16-1)

The ADC was so strapped for resources that at times in 1952, it had only 20 aircraft performing air defense alerts for the whole United States (Headquarters Air Defense, 1952b). For the ADC, the situation was dire. It feared that if the United States were attacked, it would not be able to defend it.

Complicating the ADC’s predicament was the fact that Congress and the public were pushing for more effective air defenses. A series of reports in 1950 and 1951 illuminated air defense deficiencies (Schaffel, 1991). These reports led Representative Carl Vinson, chair of the House Armed Services Committee, to warn the Air Force that if it did not upgrade air defenses, Congress would consider giving the role to someone else.

This threat did not lead to a change in Air Force policy. General Hoyt Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, commented in 1953 that it was not air defenses that were restraining the United States’ potential enemies but the threat of retaliatory attack (Futrell, 1989). Air Force leadership believed that World War II and the development of nuclear weapons had made air defenses largely moot. For Air Force leaders, the best defense was a good offense. Only by threatening retaliation could one
deter attack. These views led the Air Force to refuse to place more resources in the ADC.

ADC had its back to the wall. It was being pressured from the outside to provide a higher level of performance while being starved for resources from the inside. This led the ADC to begin looking for aid in performing its mission (Headquarters Air Defense, 1953a). First, it began asking other Air Force commands for the use of their aircraft during an air defense emergency. If an attack came, ADC wanted these commands to place aircraft under ADC control. None of the commands would make a firm commitment to the ADC. All said that if aircraft were available, they would help ADC; none made a firm commitment that they would be available. ADC then turned to the U.S. Navy for aid. Again, ADC was given no firm commitment.

Finally, ADC turned to the Air National Guard. As a 1952 ADC semiannual historical report stated, "Air National Guard squadrons repre-sented . . . too tempting a resource to be withheld from air defense pending an emergency" (Headquarters Air Defense, 1952a, p. 120). Beginning in the middle of 1952, the Air National Guard and ADC began discussions about using Guard squadrons in air defense alerts. Throughout these discussions, ADC made clear that it would support the program only if Air National Guard aircrews were not charged to its personnel ceilings. The program was to augment ADC manpower, not substitute for it (Headquarters Air Defense, 1953c).

By the end of 1952, the National Guard Bureau and ADC had worked out the details of the Runway Alert program. They then had to sell it to the rest of the Air Force. Initially, the Air Force resisted the idea of using Air Guard units alongside active-duty air defense forces (Gross, 1985; Headquarters Air Defense, 1952a). The Air Force did not think Air Guard units were capable of performing the mission. It also questioned whether Guard units could legally be used in peacetime. However, ADC and the National Guard Bureau were able to convince the Air Force that this was a means of expanding air defenses at little cost to the Air Force as a whole. Few if any Air Force resources would be needed because the Air Guard had its own on which to draw. These arguments convinced the Air Force to begin the Runway Alert experiment in 1953 and to make it a formal Air Force program in 1954.

ADC support for the program did not last long. Beginning in 1956, the ADC began denigrating Air Guard performance and demanding that the Air Guard role in air defense be reduced. In a letter to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force dated November 14, 1956, Lt. General Joseph Atkinson,
Commander of ADC, stated that "ADC does not support, and objects to, any policy which provides for a diversion of first line resources to reserve components at the expense of the regular establishment" (Headquarters Air Defense, 1956).

In the same letter, ADC objected to equipping Guard units with all-weather aircraft as well. These complaints turned to outright opposition to sharing the air defense mission with the Guard by 1959. This can be seen in Lt. General Atkinson's letter to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force dated May, 25, 1959.

Reserve forces should have no role in the air defense fighting forces. . . . I vigorously oppose equipping them with first line weapons. . . . This demands immediate response to command . . . "command by negotiation, persuasion and state politics will not do the job." I put little dependence on the Air National Guard as an emergency augmentation. Reserve forces belong in minimum cost, minimum support missions which do not materially compete with us for resources. I recommend a concerted effort to so employ them. (Quoted in Gross, 1985, p. 107)

ADC opposition to Air Guard participation in the air defense mission had nothing to do with performance. Air Guard units involved in the Runway Alert program performed as well as active Air Force air defense units and sometimes better (Davey, 1957; Didear, 1960). ADC turned against the program because it felt that the Guard was running away with the mission, and it was.

ADC complaints went for nought. By 1959, the Air Force as a whole was able to see the merits of the Runway Alert program. This happened because the success of the Guard in performing air defense alerts allowed the Air Force to reduce the active forces tied to ADC and move them into higher priority missions—namely, those involved with the SAC (U.S. Air Force Oral History, 1978a). There was no way that ADC could convince the leaders of the Air Force that removing the Guard from air defense was in the interests of the organization. It may have been in the interests of ADC but not of the Air Force as a whole.

This can be seen in a statement made to the National Guard's annual convention in 1958 by David S. Smith, assistant secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

Clearly, with the requirement on one hand, and with the urgent need to control and reduce expenditures on the other, the Air Force cannot afford a full-time force to handle every risk ahead of it. We must place a large share
of our defense burden on you and your fellow Guardsman throughout the nation. (Quoted in Gross, 1985, p. 114)

CEDING AUTONOMY

Having examined why the Air Force was willing to first share and eventually cede air defense to the Guard, it is time to examine why the Air Guard was willing to cede autonomy to the Air Force to obtain the air defense mission. The National Guard has always valued the autonomy that comes with its being both a state- and nationally controlled organization. This allows it to resist and block policies that the Guard feels may be harmful to it.

In the late 1940s and 1950s, the Guard was quite leery of the active services (Gross, 1985; Hill, 1964). As indicated earlier, the Air Force attempted to eliminate the Air Guard in 1948, and the Air Guard believed its units were intentionally misused during the Korean War. Guard leaders were suspicious of any policy emanating from the active services during this time. Policies that looked good on the outside were seen as potential Trojan horses that would end up destroying the Guard if it accepted them. These perceptions increase the significance of autonomy. If an organization cannot trust another, it wants to be autonomous from it, not dependent on it (Wilson, 1989). Considering this, why would the Air Guard be willing to risk its existence by giving some of its autonomy to an organization it did not trust?

At the end of the Korean War, the Air Guard faced three major problems. The first was Air Force perceptions of the Guard (Gross, 1985; Schriever, 1951). Many in the Air Force felt that Guardsman were little more than weekend warriors. They played war once a month and went home again. Air Force leaders also perceived Guard officers as being mere political appointees. They were not chosen for their military skills and competence but for the political support they had given to the governors of the states. Air Force leaders saw the Guard more as 48 independent flying clubs than a reserve force.

These perceptions led the Air Force to minimize the Guard’s roles and resources (Gross, 1985). In the late 1940s, the Air Force spent little effort training the Guard or providing it with equipment. Needless to say, when the Guard was mobilized for the Korean conflict, its units were woefully unprepared. As the annual report of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau put it, “The Air Guard’s days were numbered . . . unless it could live down the widely prevalent reputation of its elements as mere flying
clubs or forty-eight little air forces” (Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 1963, p. 10). The Runway Alert program offered this opportunity. By sitting alerts and intercepting unidentified aircraft in peacetime, Air Guard units could show that they were prepared for wartime. It could also show that its officers and men were competent and had come to their positions through merit, not politics.

The second problem the Air Guard confronted was obsolescent equipment (Gross, 1985, 1986). At the end of the Korean War, most Air Guard units were supplied with propeller-driven fighter planes from World War II. These aircraft were largely useless in the jet age. For the Air Guard to survive as the Air Force’s primary combat reserve, it needed newer, more capable equipment. The only way to obtain this equipment was for the Guard to obtain a mission that required it. Not only were Guard aircraft obsolete but so were the bases where units were located. Most of them did not have runways long enough to handle jet aircraft (Gross, 1985). Again, the Runway Alert program was the solution. For Air Guard units to sit alerts alongside active Air Force units, they needed equipment that was the same or at least similar to what the active units had. This also would lead to the upgrading of bases. Runways would have to be extended and modernized for the Guard to use the jet aircraft that the air defense mission required.

Finally, Air Guard leaders had to justify the continuance of combat units within its ranks (Gross, 1985). The Air Force felt that the best use of its reserve forces, like the Guard, was in support missions, not combat missions. Support missions are things such as air traffic control, maintenance, medical care, and military policing. The Air Guard, and National Guard in general, has consistently opposed the elimination of its combat units. Combat units give the Guard a higher profile. They—not the units that support them—receive the publicity during war. Combat units are far more expensive to create and maintain than a similar-sized support unit. This justifies larger flows of resources into the Guard during peacetime. Again, the Runway Alert program was a good solution for this problem. Not only did it guarantee the Guard a combat role during wartime, but it also allowed the Guard to show its puissance during peacetime.

The Guard wanted a mission that it could perform alongside the active service in peacetime. As a an ADC historical report stated, the
National Guard Bureau [took] a firm stand that [the Runway Alert] proposal was [not] acceptable if the purpose was to provide training for Air National Guard units. . . . An operational requirement for air defense was the only basis upon which [the] plan would be considered. 5 (Headquarters Air Defense, 1953c, p. 86)

If the program did not create an operational mission, it would not solve the problems laid out above. The Guard did not want to be merely training for air defense; it wanted to actually be doing air defense. Only by performing the mission alongside active-duty crews could perceptions be changed. Moreover, the need to perform would then force the Air Force to give the Guard the resources needed to expand air bases and supply it with equipment. Finally, performance of air defense in peacetime would give the Air Guard favorable publicity and justify the existence of combat units among its ranks.

The Runway Alert program was the solution to the most significant problems facing the Air Guard during the 1950s. However, it came at a cost. The Air Force would not include the Guard in air defense if it did not allow the Air Force greater control of its units (Gross, 1985, 1986). The Air Force wanted to be able to directly control the various units in the program. This meant that the Air Force would determine the standards to be met by the units and their personnel. It would also determine how they were trained and evaluated.

This may look like an easy trade-off for the Guard. It was not. Remember that the Air Force had attempted to eliminate the Guard in 1948, 5 years before the Runway Alert program was created. Giving the Air Force control over the evaluation of Guard units created the possibility that the Air Force would use this power to show the Guard as incompetent, thus justifying its elimination or reduction as a reserve force. The Air Force could also use the control of training and personnel standards to hurt the Guard, not help it.

As a comparison, the Army Guard has resisted efforts by the Army to hold it to the same standards as active units and to allow direct control of its units by the Army (Heller, 1994; Jacobs, 1994; Sorley, 1993). 6 The Army Guard has even resisted the adoption of the Army’s accounting, personnel, and inventory systems. Army Guard leaders justify this resistance by arguing that using the Army’s systems and standards would allow the Army to exploit it. It would not help the Guard but merely hurt it. Autonomy is a commodity that the Army Guard refuses to relinquish.
THE IMPLICATIONS

What lessons can be drawn from the willingness of the Air Force to share turf and the Air Guard to cede autonomy? First, the ADC became willing to share turf with the Guard only when it found that it could not perform the air defense mission on its own. Before turning to the Guard for help, ADC looked to other Air Force commands. When these commands refused to make the commitments that ADC required, only then did it turn to the Guard for help. Sharing turf was the only way for ADC to complete the tasks assigned it.

At a more fundamental level, ADC was attempting to ensure its survival by sharing turf with the Guard. If war came and ADC was unable to perform the air defense mission, its existence would be threatened. By employing Guard units, ADC decreased the chances of mission failure, thus increasing its own chances of survival and, in ADC eyes, the very existence of the country. However, in attempting to ensure its survival, ADC opened the door to its demise.

Initially, the Air Force was against sharing the air defense mission with the Guard. Once ADC began to share the mission, the Air Force quickly realized the benefits that could be accrued from it for the organization as a whole. Air defense was a secondary mission for the Air Force. Resources given to this mission were resources that could not be given to the Air Force’s preferred missions—strategic bombing and nuclear deterrence. Once the Guard showed that it could perform the air defense mission at less cost than active units, the Air Force began increasing the Guard’s air defense role and moving resources out of the ADC.

This led to the ADC turning against its own program. Remember, in 1956 the ADC began denigrating its Air Guard units, and by 1959, it was calling for a complete halt to the Guard’s use in air defense. ADC became quite protective of its turf when it began to look as if the Guard was going to run away with its mission. ADC complaints were too little, too late. The Air Force could see the benefits that were accruing to the whole from the Runway Alert program and refused to cut Guard participation. Guard participation in air defense continued to increase until it was performing 100% of the mission by the late 1990s.

This highlights an important dynamic that is often ignored by the literature on bureaucratic turf and imperialism. Organizations are not monolithic. The case shows how subunits within an organization may find it beneficial to share turf to complete a task or mission. The bridges these subunits build to other organizations can then be exploited by the sub-
units' larger organization and the exploitation may come at the subunits' expense as it did for the ADC. If the ADC had been autonomous, it may have been willing to share the air defense mission initially. However, ADC would never have allowed the Guard's role to become so large that ADC's very existence was threatened. If ADC had been autonomous, it is unlikely that the Air Guard would have become the continental United States' primary air defense provider from the mid-1970s onward.\(^7\)

At the same time, ceding the air defense mission to the Guard increased autonomy for the Air Force as a whole. The Air Force did not want to place resources into air defense. Outsiders, Congress and public pressure, forced the Air Force to place some resources in this mission. By ceding the mission to the Guard the Air Force was able to move resources to other missions that it valued more. At the same time, it could show outsiders that the air defense mission was not being neglected. The Air Force would not have been able to obtain this autonomy if not for the actions of the ADC. The ADC's actions were not motivated by increasing autonomy but by the need to accomplish the tasks assigned to it. The Air Force as a whole would never have built the bridges to the Guard that the ADC found so essential to its survival. The Air Force at the time was the dominant military service in the United States. It was secure enough politically and financially that it would never have looked to an outside organization for help in performing one of its missions. In fact, the Air Force was quite skeptical about using the Guard in air defense and opposed the Runway Alert program initially.

Lessons can be drawn from the Air Guard side of the case as well. Autonomy is important for organizations. However, organizations may be quite willing to give up autonomy if doing so guarantees them more resources, a secure role or mission, or other perquisites that help to ensure their survival. The Air Guard was faced with a dilemma in the 1950s. It feared becoming marginalized with few resources and neither a peacetime nor a wartime role. It also feared the Air Force. Yet, to obtain the role it wanted, it had to be willing to cede some autonomy and control to the Air Force and assume the risks that came with this cession. In hindsight, ceding autonomy turned out to be harmless to the Guard. At the time, Air Guard leaders were deciding whether to trade roles for autonomy; the harmlessness of the Air Force was anything but certain.

In the end, an important role and the resources that came with it trumped the loss of autonomy. Air Guard leaders felt that not taking the air defense role would lead to the Air Guard's demise. This can be contrasted with the actions of the Army Guard. It has resisted giving autonomy to the
Army (Heller, 1994; Jacobs, 1994; Sorley, 1993). Although the Army Guard has managed to maintain its existence, the Army has often marginalized the Guard’s role and has even refused to use it during times of war. Army Guard combat units have not been used by the Army since Korea. There have been several opportunities for these units to be used. In every case, the Army has refused. Here Guard leaders decided not to give up autonomy. The result has been an organization that has been marginalized.

CONCLUSION

The motivations of bureaucrats and organizations are more complex than much of the literature would have us believe. Turf, power, and autonomy are important to organizations and their leaders (Niskanen, 1971; Rourke, 1969; Wilson, 1989). However, this study has shown that task completion is important as well. The ADC was starved for resources in the 1950s. To carry out its tasks, it turned to the Air Guard for help. In doing so, ADC relinquished turf. It also created a competitor for the air defense mission.

The ADC’s initiative had the unintended effect of increasing the autonomy of the Air Force as a whole. This led to the Air Force turning on its own suborganization in the late 1950s, refusing to reduce the Air Guard role in air defense. Eventually, the Air Force gave most of the air defense mission to the Guard, thereby destroying the ADC. However, ADC was essential for this process to begin. It was ADC that proposed sharing the air defense mission and it was ADC that succeeded in breaking down Air Force opposition to the sharing of the mission.

Finally, the Air Guard was willing to give up autonomy to participate in Continental Air Defense. Autonomy took a backseat to the resources that air defense promised and the security that a peacetime role provided to the Air Guard as an organization.

This case also shows the importance of subunits within organizations. If organizations were mere monoliths, the sharing of turf seen in this case would not have occurred. Moreover, the actions subunits take to protect their interests can later be used by the organization as a whole and actually lead to the subunit being harmed.
NOTES

1. This case study focuses on a set of interactions and decisions that took place in the 1950s. These interactions led to the Air Force sharing the air defense role with the Air National Guard. This article does not go beyond this time period. The primary reason for this is that the case is designed only to examine why one organization would be willing to share turf with another. It is not intended to examine fully how the relationship between two organizations changes, evolves, and develops over time. This does not mean examining the development of the Air Guard/Air Force relationship would not provide us with significant insights into organizational behavior. A previous article (Buterbaugh, 1999) has had this as its focus, and future ones will delve more deeply into how and why the Air Force/Air Guard relationship has become a model for other active service and reserve organizations. A secondary reason is that after 1960, most of the information needed to examine the Air Guard/Air Force relationship in detail is classified. As more of this information is declassified, I hope to examine more fully the relationships of these two organizations.

2. The information here comes from the Chief of the National Guard Bureau Annual Reports for the years 1951 to 1996.

3. Close air support is the use of aircraft to support ground units that are engaged in combat. Success in this mission requires the Air Force to work closely with soldiers on the ground and to take orders from them. This is something the Air Force has often been less than interested in doing.

4. The National Guard Bureau initiated these discussions.

5. Initially, there were two proposals for the Runway Alert program. Both saw the Guard being used to augment active-duty units in peacetime. There was some discussion by the Air Force to use Guard units only as part of its annual training in air defense and not to share the mission with the Air Guard.

6. I use the Army Guard only as an example of how the Air Force/Air Guard relationship could look. There are many reasons why the Air Force and Air Guard have been able to cooperate with each other whereas the Army and Army Guard have not. Examining these reasons is beyond the scope of this article. These will be the focus of a future case study.

7. The sharing of the Air Defense Mission seems to have been the first step in the sharing of a host of other missions with the Guard. Today, Air Guard and Air Force Reserve units perform many missions for the Air Force during peacetime. Also, during the Gulf War, the Air Force made a point of using some Air Guard combat units even though this meant some similar active combat units did not see action (Gross, 1995).

REFERENCES


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